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Abstract
At 07:39 on 11 March 2004, 10 terrorist bomb explosions occurred almost simultaneously in four
commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killing 177 people instantly and injuring more than 2000. There were
14 subsequent in-hospital deaths, bringing the ultimate death toll to 191. This report describes the
organization of clinical management and patterns of injuries in casualties who were taken to the closest
hospital, with an emphasis on the critically ill. A total of 312 patients were taken to the hospital and 91
patients were hospitalized, of whom 89 (28.5%) remained in hospital for longer than 24 hours. Sixty-
two patients had only superficial bruises or emotional shock, but the remaining 250 patients had more
severe injuries. Data on 243 of these 250 patients form the basis of this report. Tympanic perforation
occurred in 41% of 243 victims with moderate-to-severe trauma, chest injuries in 40%, shrapnel
wounds in 36%, fractures in 18%, first-degree or second-degree burns in 18%, eye lesions in 18%,
head trauma in 12% and abdominal injuries in 5%. Between 08:00 and 17:00, 34 surgical
interventions were performed in 32 patients. Twenty-nine casualties (12% of the total, or 32.5% of
those hospitalized) were deemed to be in a critical condition, and two of these died within minutes of
arrival. The other 27 survived to admission to intensive care units, and three of them died, bringing the
critical mortality rate to 17.2% (5/29). The mean Injury Severity Score and Acute Physiology and
Chronic Health Evaluation II scores for critically ill patients were 34 and 23, respectively. Among these
critically ill patients, soft tissue and musculoskeletal injuries predominated in 85% of cases, ear blast
injury was identified in 67% and blast lung injury was present in 63%. Fifty-two per cent suffered head
trauma. Over-triage to the closest hospital probably occurred, and the time of the blasts proved to be
crucial to the the adequacy of the medical and surgical response. The number of blast lung injuries
seen is probably the largest reported by a single institution, and the critical mortality rate was
reasonably low.
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Introduction
Massacres resulting from bombing are historically among the
most common forms of terrorist violence and present with a
unique epidemiology [1]. They cause specific lesions, such as
those due to the primary effect of blast. Most critical body
system injuries are found among those who are killed
immediately, and these are the same body system injuries that
most commonly cause death in all other forms of trauma [2].
Terrorist bombings around the world during the past 35 years
have occurred primarily in urban areas; they frequently
generated multiple casualties, but local medical resources
were adequate to provide care for victims [2–6]. True mass
casualty events are a very different situation, and by definition
they involve such large numbers of victims, or such severe or
unique injuries that local medical resources cannot fully cope
with them. The most important way to prepare for the large
casualty loads caused by bombing disasters is to understand
the patterns of injuries and logistical problems that result. A
retrospective analysis of implemented organization and
clinical management can identify helpful decisions and errors
[2].
This report provides a detailed review of in-hospital triage,
patterns of injuries and care for victims treated at the closest
hospital, with an emphasis on the critically ill.
Methods
On Thursday 11 March 2004, a terrorist bomb attack was
perpetrated in Madrid, Spain, which led to one of the most
calamitous mass injury situations of its kind in Europe during
recent decades. Ten bags containing charges of TNT
(trinitrotoluene) were detonated in four commuter trains at
rush hour; the trains were at different train stations in the
centre of town. The explosions took place between 07:39
and 07:42, and all emergency services were immediately
alerted. Overall data on the number of victims treated at the
different hospitals, primary care facilities and at the scene, as
well as the logistics involved, were reported by the Health
Authority of the ‘Comunidad de Madrid’ Local Government.
Data on the patients received at Gregorio Marañón University
General Hospital (GMUGH), surgical organization and
resources used were in part kept concurrently by the authors,
and in part obtained retrospectively by chart review.
We defined as ‘critical’ any casualty presenting with an acute
airway, or breathing, circulatory or neurological problems that
required immediate surgical intervention and/or admission to
an intensive care unit (ICU), and all patients admitted with
endotracheal intubation. Neurological status was quickly
assessed when appropriate using the Glasgow Coma Scale.
The degree of severity in critically ill patients was assessed
using the Injury Severity Score (ISS) and Acute Physiology
and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) II score during the
first 24 hours of admission to the ICU. Blast lung injury (BLI)
was diagnosed on the basis of hypoxaemia and characteristic
radiographic lung opacities, with or without pneumothorax,
and absence of rib fractures or chest wall injury [7].
Nevertheless, it is well known that the presence of chest wall
injury does not necessarily exclude BLI; it just makes it harder
to diagnose. Fisher’s exact test and χ2 tests were used to
compare the group with BLI versus the group with lung
contusions resulting from chest wall trauma.
Results
Initial emergency treatment and triage was carried out by
emergency medical services near the scenes of the blasts,
and the victims were subsequently transferred to GMUGH
and other hospitals. The vast majority of survivors were
evacuated by ambulance and many others by private vehicles.
Most casualties arrived between 8:00 and 11:00.
According to official information, at 21:00 on that day 1430
casualties had been treated, 966 of whom were taken to 15
public community hospitals. The two largests public hospitals
in Madrid (GMUGH and 12 de Octubre University General
Hospital, with 1800 and 1300 beds, respectively) received
around 53% of those casualties. The other victims were
treated in primary care facilities and near the scenes of the
blasts. Many other casualties with mild injuries were received
at different facilities on the days following the blasts. Very few
patients were taken to private hospitals.
The explosions resulted in 2062 casualties, 177 (8.6%) of
whom were killed immediately (deaths at the scene). There
were 14 subsequent deaths (in-hospital deaths), which
occurred either on the same day or later on, among 82
victims who were reported to be in a critical condition at
21:00 on that day, bringing the total death toll to 191 and the
overall ‘critical mortality’ rate to 17%.
According to official information, the resources mobilized to
care for the wounded and their families was unprecedented
in our country, with over 70,000 health personnel involved,
291 ambulances for transport, 200 firemen, 13 groups of
psychologists, 500 volunteers, thousands of donations of
blood at hospitals and in 10 mobile units, and 1725 blood
donors from other regions of the country. In addition, more
than  €26,540,544 was estimated to have been spent on
insurance and compensation for families of the dead. The
112 emergency communication centres received more than
20,000 phone calls during the morning of the blasts.
A total of 312 casualties were treated at GMUGH, 272 of
them between 08:00 and 10:30. No secondary transfer of
patients was made to or from GMUGH. The mean age of
victims was 32 years (range 14–63 years) and 59% were
males. Of the 312 victims, 62 had no signs or symptoms
other than superficial bruises or emotional shock, and these
were treated with a mild sedative and support from qualified
personnel. The remaining 250 had more severe lesions, and
data on 243 of them were retrieved and form the basis of this106
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report. Eighty-nine victims (28.5% of the 312 victims) were
admitted to hospital for more than 24 hours, and 29 (12% of
the total 243, or 32.5% of those admitted) were deemed to
be in a critical condition. By 31 March 2004, only 30 patients
remained hospitalized, five of whom were in a critical
condition. The last patient was discharged home on 2 August
2004. No correlation between old age and length of stay was
observed, but patients with burns had longer hospital stays.
The rate of over-triage to GMUGH was well over 50%, and
the under-triage rate was zero.
Organization and logistics of the management of the
mass casualty situation at GMUGH
GMUGH is a 1800-bed teaching public hospital, serving a
population of more than 650,000 people, and is located in
the centre of Madrid, near Atocha railway station, which was
the epicentre of the terrorist attack. At 07:59 the first victim
walked into the emergency department (ED) suffering from an
ear blast injury.
Immediate action was taken to cancel all scheduled surgical
interventions in the 22 available rooms, and 161 hospitalized
patients were discharged home from the various wards in
under 2 hours. A number of patients in the ICU and surgical
ICU, with 28 beds in total, were evacuated to intermediate
care units, as deemed appropriate. The recovery room, with a
maximum capacity of 10–12 beds and adjacent to the surgical
ICU, was also made available to receive critically ill patients.
The 123 patients who were kept under observation at the ED
at 07:30, before the blasts occurred, were either discharged
home when appropriate or transferred to the wards, and only
10 of them remained in the ED at 09:30. All elective
diagnostic procedures were deferred. At the same time, the
Teaching Pavillion, adjacent to the ED, was used as an
information center for the families, authorities and the media.
Triage was performed by senior faculty members at the
entrance to the ED and continued until around 10:30. Two
patients were directly taken for surgery, and most intubated
patients and those who looked to be critically ill were
immediately taken to the adjacent ‘shock room’ and other
nearby rooms for primary survey and resuscitation, in
accordance with Advanced Trauma Life Support protocols.
Our shock room has the capacity to treat three to four
severely injured patients simultaneously. Teams of general
surgeons and anaesthesiologists examined all of the critically
ill patients initially, and the need for further examination by
subspecialty teams such as orthopaedic, neurosurgical,
cardiovascular, thoracic, maxillofacial and plastic surgical
teams was determined. All patients were examined, at some
time during the day or later, by ear, nose and throat teams to
rule out injury to the tympanic membrane.
Out of more than 27 victims assessed in the shock rooms,
seven haemodynamically unstable patients were immediately
taken for surgery and the others were triaged to radiology
departments or ICUs. In these units, further assessment was
undertaken and additional patients sent for surgery. Minor
casualties were triaged to different areas of the ED for
assessment, wound dressing and suturing.
Focused abdominal sonography for trauma was performed in
37 patients during the first 3 hours, at different rooms and
units, and 40 spiral computed tomography scans had been
done by the end of the day, as well as 270 plain radiographs
and three vascular interventional radiology procedures. The
blood bank delivered 145 units of type-specific blood during
the day (90 of them in the first 4 hours), 60 units of fresh
frozen plasma and 75 units of platelets.
The absence of previous experience with a mass casualty
event of that proportion was probably counterbalanced by the
commitment of every person directly or indirectly involved in
the treatment of victims and by spontaneous leadership
assumed in different areas. All in all, common sense,
diligence in triage of patients and serenity seemed to prevail
after the initial chaos and emotional trauma, which are
unavoidable and common to such situations. There was in
fact an abundance of medical teams, nursing staff and
resources to treat the critically injured, and no critically injured
patient experienced a delay in treatment.
Injuries sustained, mortality and surgical interventions
Many of the 243 assessed casualties were walking wounded
and their injuries were minor-to-moderate, requiring only
simple dressing or sutures, but some wounds were grossly
contaminated and with much tissue loss.
The most frequent injuries found in the 243 victims were
tympanic membrane perforations, chest injuries, shrapnel
wounds and fractures. Table 1 summarizes the most frequent
types of injuries sustained; there is significant overlap among
the groups because many if not most patients had more than
one injury or fracture.
No patients were dead on arrival, but five died subsequently,
two of them shortly after admission. One of the latter was a
moribund patient who died at the ED within minutes of her
arrival, probably from severe head trauma. Another died with
an open cranial wound while being readied for surgical
intervention. A third patient died in the ICU at 10:30 from
bilateral lung contusion and a thoracic aorta tear. A fourth
victim died on that morning while undergoing damage control
laparotomy. The only death in a patient who had survived for
more than 24 hours was due to multiple organ failure, and this
death occurred on the day 7 after admission. She was 22
years old, and had bilateral hemopneumothorax and lung
contusion, maxillofacial fractures and avulsion of the left ear,
apart from first-degree and second-degree burns. The five
fatalities are included in the critical care group of 29 patients,
and so our critical mortality rate was 17.2%. If the two patients107
who arrived in extremis and became immediate fatalities are
excluded, then the critical mortality rate becomes 11%.
Between 08:00 and 17:00, 34 surgical interventions were
performed in 32 victims and in 19 different rooms; one of
these patients died (as mentioned above) while undergoing
unplanned revision for continued bleeding after a damage
control laparotomy. Later in the day, three more interventions
were conducted. A 27-year-old woman with catastrophic
injuries to her left leg (open femur and tibia fractures, and
severe bleeding and loss of tissue), in addition to other
severe injuries, was operated on three times, bringing to 37
the number of interventions and 34 the number of victims
who underwent surgery on an urgent or emergency basis that
day. Many procedures required collaboration among different
surgical specialties, and soft tissue and musculoskeletal
injuries accounted for almost 50% of all operations
performed. Table 2 shows the 37 major surgical procedures
conducted in 34 patients during the first 24 hours. Minor
procedures such as minor plastic suturing and wound
debridement were also performed in many of these patients.
By the end of the first week, 11 further interventions had
been performed, mainly orthopaedic and plastic surgery
procedures. Of the seven laparotomies performed on that
day, one was nontherapeutic and two were negative, one of
them with an associated negative thoracotomy. One patient
underwent splenectomy and two underwent bowel resection
and bowel suture. Only the patient with the damage control
laparotomy died. He had a large open abdominal wound with
embedded shrapnel and evisceration, a shattered right colon
and profuse retroperitoneal bleeding, apart from head trauma
that could not be assessed.
The three vascular interventional radiology procedures
performed were for embolization of the intercostal artery,
hepatic bleeding and hepatosplenic bleeding. The two patients
with hepatic bleeding had also previously undergone
craniotomy for large subdural haematomas. All three inter-
ventional procedures were successful in stopping the bleeding.
Critical patient population
Twenty-seven critically ill patients survived initially to be
admitted to ICUs; as mentioned above, three of these
patients died. The ICU and hospital stays (mean ± standard
error) were 10 ± 4 and 18 ± 6 days, respectively. The mean
ISS and APACHE II scores were 34 and 23, respectively.
Figure 1 shows the distribution by ISS intervals. The ISS of
the three patients who died were 75, 57 and 57. Table 1
shows the different injuries, as compared with the overall
population, and all ICU patients sustained multiple injuries. Of
all critically ill patients 67% presented with ear blast injuries,
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Table 1
Main types of injuries sustained in the overall and critical
patients populations at Gregorio Marañón University General
Hospital
Overall Critically  ill 
population patients 
Injuries (n = 243) (n = 27)
Tympanic perforation: 99 (41%) 18 (67%)
Unilateral 27 (11%) 1
Bilateral 72 (29%) 17
Chest: 97 (40%) 24 (89%)
Rib fractures 18 (7%) 7 (26%)
BLI 17 (7%) 17 (63%)
Pneumothorax 11 (4%) 10 (37%)
Haemothorax 6 (2%) 6 (25%)
Shrapnel wounds (soft tissues): 89 (36%) 23 (85%)
Head–neck 53 (21%)
Trunk 11 (4%)
Extremities 25 (10%)
Fractures 44 (18%) 15 (55%)
Long bones 18 (7%) 9 (33%)
Maxillofacial 16 (6%) 8 (29%)
Metatarsal 8 (3%)
Spine 5 (2%) 5 (18%)
Burns: 45 (18%) 16 (59%)
First degree 16 (6%)
Second degree 29 (12%)
Eyes 41 (16%) 4 (15%)
Head trauma: 29 (12%) 14 (52%)
Fractured skull base 5
Brain contusions 4
Subdural hematoma 4
Other 12
Abdominal: 12 (5%) 10 (37%)
Liver 5 4
Spleen 4 4
Bowel 3 3
Kidney 3 2
Amputations: 13 (5%) 9 (33%)
Ear 11 8 (29%)
Finger 1
Left lower limb 1 1
Post-traumatic stress disorder 22 (9%)
Values are expressed as n or as n (%). BLI, blast lung injury.
Table 2
Types and numbers of surgical interventions performed in 34
victims during the first 24 hours
Type of intervention Number (n = 37)
Orthopaedic 15 (40.5%)
Abdominal 7 (18.9%)
Neurosurgical 6 (16.2%)
Maxillofacial 5 (13.5%)
Plastic 3 (8.1%)
Ophthalmic 1 (2.7%)
Values are expressed as n (%).108
and in eight patients the damage to the tympanic membrane
was combined with burns and avulsions of the ear.
Twenty-four critical patients had lung lesions; 17 of them had
BLI and seven had lung damage associated with injury to the
chest wall. These lung injuries were bilateral in 71% of all
cases. Of all critically ill patients 80% required mechanical
ventilation for respiratory failure or coma, and 37% were
mechanically ventilated for more than 7 days. We identified
two different cohorts of patients according to whether the
lung damage was associated with chest wall injury or not,
and found that those with associated chest wall injury had
more prolonged ventilation and a greater incidence of
ventilator-associated pneumonia, but the differences were not
statistically significant (Table 3).
According to computed tomography scans, the severity of
head injuries was assessed as severe in 60%, moderate in
13% and mild in 27% of the critically ill patients. Fractures to
the base of the skull and brain contusions were the most
common findings, whereas subarachnoid haemorrhage and
brain swelling were also frequent.
Ten critically ill patients had abdominal injuries, and half of
them underwent surgical treatment. In three patients the
treatment was conservative and two required an inter-
ventional radiology procedure to control bleeding, as
mentioned above. One-third of this critically ill population
suffered fractures to extremities. Of these 60% were open
and often associated with gross soft tissue damage. They
were evenly distributed in the upper and lower limbs. Almost
as many patients had maxillofacial fractures. Traumatic
amputation of one ear proved to be a marker of severity, and
only one critically ill patient arrived with a major traumatic
amputation of the left lower limb (Table 1).
Four patients (15%), all of them severely wounded, presented
with eye lesions. Three of them were very severe, with one
traumatic unilateral enucleation, two blast eyes with intraocular
haemorrhage, and two perforations with an intraocular foreign
body, each resulting in partial or total loss of sight.
Discussion
Injuries resulting from bombs and exploding munitions have
been analyzed extensively and described in a large number of
publications. Victims very often suffer the worst forms of both
blunt and penetrating trauma. The three major causes of
injuries in such incidents include the blast effect or shock
wave, flash burns from the heat of the explosion, and
penetrating wounds from the ballistic effects of the shrapnel
[2–6,8–14].
Indoor detonations tend to cause more severe primary blast
injuries than do open air, outdoor bombings. Leibovici and
coworkers [10] documented a 7.8% mortality rate among
204 casualties involved in open air bombings in Jerusalem,
and a 49% mortality rate among 93 victims of detonations
inside buses.
One of the most consistent injury patterns noted among
survivors of terrorist bombings is the overwhelming pre-
dominance of relatively minor, noncritical injuries that are not
life-threatening [3,4,6,14]. These are usually caused by
secondary and tertiary blast effects, and are typically soft
tissue and skeletal injuries that nevertheless tend to be
extensive and contaminated, and require multiple procedures.
Among survivors at GMUGH, soft tissue, musculoskeletal
and ear blast injuries predominated in up to 80% of cases,
but mostly they were noncritical in severity and contributed
virtually nothing to mortality. There were multiple
contaminated wounds containing various debris and
fragments. Wound debridement in these patients was
necessary to prevent infection and accounted for more than a
third of all operations performed in the first 24 hours.
The incidence of critical injuries among survivors varies between
9% and 22% [2]. Chest and abdominal injuries, including BLI,
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Figure 1
Injury Severity Score (ISS) distribution in the critically ill patients.
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Table 3
Comparison between patients with blast lung injury and those
with lung contusion and chest wall trauma
Chest wall 
BLI trauma 
Parameter (n = 17) (n = 7) P
Mechanical ventilation 87% 100% NS (P = 0.49)
Days of mechanical ventilation 5.35 8.75 NS (P > 0.05)
ARDS 24% 25% NS (P = 0.58)
VAP 13% 35% NS (P = 0.32)
Mean ISS 31 34 NS (P > 0.05)
ARDS, acute respiratory distress syndrome;  BLI, blast lung injury; 
ISS, Injury Severity Score; VAP, ventilator-associated pneumonia.109
and traumatic amputations occur very infrequently among
survivors of bombings, because the most critical cases are
selected out by the initial blast, succumbing to immediate death
[15]. However, the few surviving patients with these injuries
have a substantial specific mortality, and these injuries should
be recognized as prognostic markers of severity.
Most victims of primary BLI from explosions are killed
immediately, and late deaths among the small number of
survivors with this injury are caused by progressive pulmonary
insufficiency, which has all the radiographic and pathologic
signs of parenchymal haemorrhage, similar to blunt contusions.
The 63% incidence (17 cases) of BLI seen in our critically ill
patients, which is higher than previously reported [7], probably
reflects a bias in triage of many severely wounded patients to
our hospital, which was closest to the blasts.
In a similar way, the ear – an organ that is very sensitive to
blast injury – was damaged at a percentage similar to that for
lung. The majority of critically ill patients had both lesions, and
in these circumstances one should check for both injuries
when the other is present.
Traumatic amputation is frequently associated with other
critical injuries and a high mortality rate [4], and only one of
our surviving patients arrived with a major traumatic
amputation. Severe head injury is very common and is also a
leading cause of death in victims of blasts, and was probably
the major contributing cause in two of our five fatalities. Burns
are also relatively infrequent among survivors of bombings
and tend to be mild flash burns with low mortality [4].
Recent experience from Israel shows that injuries from
terrorist acts, including explosions and gunshots, are severe
(ISS >15) in one-third of the population arriving at hospitals
alive, with 26% needing admission to the ICU, 55% having
open wounds, 31% having internal injuries, and 50%
undergoing a procedure in the operating room [13]. Also, the
mortality rate was twofold higher than inpatient death
following road traffic casualties, although the deaths were
mainly due to gunshot wounds. The high mean ISS and
APACHE II scores in our critically ill patients reflects the
severity of their injuries and clinical condition.
Emotional shock is a common consequence of terrorist
bombings. Although it is not as lethal as physical injury, there
is significant potential for long-term psychological disability.
This should be considered to be in the same category as
other major injuries that are in need of treatment [2].
Psychological assistance was very important in the Madrid
bombings, and most wounded victims and their relatives
suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome, which required
specific treatment.
Over-triage, or the rate of noncritically injured being
evacuated or hospitalized, was high in the Madrid bombings,
which is similar to rates reported elsewhere [4,6]. It has been
postulated that, in a mass casualty disaster, this over-triage
could be as life-threatening as under-triage because of the
inundation of overwhelmed medical facilities with large
numbers of noncritical casualties all at once, which could
jeopardize the survival of critically ill patients [2]. This did not
appear to play a role at GMUGH in view of our critical
mortality rate, and the under-triage was zero. Casualties
assigned to immediate hospital care must be assessed and
treated as quickly as possible, receiving only ‘minimal
acceptable care’ during the initial phase of casualty influx
[15]. Some authors consider under-triage unavoidable during
initial hospital evaluation in these chaotic situations, stressing
the importance of repeated surveys [16]. The recent uprising
in Israel introduced a previously unknown form of injury
created by new types of projectiles such as nails, bolts and
other sharp metal objects included in the explosives, causing
penetrating injuries that are difficult to detect. As a result,
even victims who arrive at the hospital with apparently
minimal injuries may require close observation and diagnostic
screening [16].
A liberal approach to early abdominal, head, and thoracic
operations is warranted in those with critical injuries to these
areas in view of their high specific mortality, and tube
thoracostomy and laparotomy can be applied on the basis of
clinical findings alone [2]. In this respect, two of our seven
laparotomies were negative and another one was non-
therapeutic – a finding that is consistent with the experience
of others [14]. In addition, surgery must be truncated in
accordance with the principles of damage control, allowing
rapid turnover of rooms [2].
Given the relative rarity of severe civilian penetrating trauma
and the lack of large urban general hospitals in the Spanish
National Health System that are categorized as trauma
centres, very few centres treat more than 120 severe trauma
cases (ISS >15) per year. Nevertheless, the experience of
the medical, nursing and ancillary staff at GMUGH with
everyday blunt civilian trauma and occasional victims of other
terrorist acts (mainly ETA [Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna] terrorism)
might have contributed somewhat to the rapid evaluation,
early operative intervention, and good-to-excellent outcomes
in most seriously injured patients.
Since the 1960s, numerous series have been published that
provide the information required for analysis of injuries and
mortality patterns. The ‘critical mortality rate’ – the death rate
among the critically injured survivors – more accurately
reflects the magnitude of the disaster and the results of
medical management than does the overall mortality rate, and
so it should be used when comparing the outcomes from
different disasters [4]. Figure 2 compares the percentage of
immediate and late deaths, and the percentage of critically ill
patients taken to hospitals in some of the worst mass
casualty situations resulting from terrorists attacks in recent
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decades. As Frykberg pointed out in a comprehensive review
[2], those mass casualty situations with an added impact of
building collapse, as in Beirut and on 11 September 2001 in
New York, had a much higher rate of immediate to late
deaths, and a lower percentage of critically ill patients. Our
17.2% critical mortality rate was similar to that in other
published series. Nevertheless, if the two immediate fatalities
deemed unpreventable in peer review are excluded, then this
critical mortality rate would be 11%. Any death that occurs
among survivors who are not critically ill should be analyzed
as an important audit filter in assessing the quality of medical
management [2]. There were no such deaths in our hospital,
and delays in care related to a high volume of walking
wounded patients was not evident.
An analysis of the patterns of injury and death from this event
corroborates some important principles regarding disaster
management. Most survivors had no critical injuries. The high
immediate death rate, and the high dead/critically wounded
ratio of >2:1 (which is in contrast to the 1:2 to 1:5 that is
typical of military combat in conventional wars) was probably
because of the extreme magnitude of the explosive force at
an indoor location, as observed by others [4].
Many previous assessments of urban mass casualty
situations in other parts of the world confirm the recent
experience in Madrid. The nearest hospitals are overwhelmed
by early arrival of all types of injured victims. Multiply injured
survivors are not the rule. Rather, most fatally injured victims
die at the scene [2–4,9,14,17]. Nevertheless, given the
relatively large number of critical patients triaged to GMUGH,
and according to recent recommendations on the subject
[18], urban hospitals should be better prepared to respond to
these mass casualty situations. As a recent survey among
members of a surgical association in the USA [19]
demonstrates, the level of preparedness among medical
personnel and facilities to cope with large-scale terrorism has
many areas of weakness.
In Madrid the bombings occurred shortly before the start of a
midweek work day when most clinicians and medical
personnel were on their way to work or already at the
hospital, and night shifts were still on duty. This, together with
empty operating rooms and personnel waiting for the first
scheduled cases, proved decisive as regards the adequacy
of the medical and surgical response at GMUGH and other
hospitals. Had the blasts occurred just 1 hour later, then the
whole situation would have been much worse and very
difficult to cope with.
Much and probably well deserved praise has been received
from many authorities in Spain and abroad, in the aftermath of
the attacks, regarding the response of our health system.
That notwithstanding, and as others have pointed out in other
places and occasions [9], our policy makers must not
confuse the community response to a disaster (which has
been proven repeatedly in all parts of the world to be a
predictably selfless and determined effort from all sides of
society) with a fully functional regional trauma system, which
we still lack. This functional trauma system requires a
determined commitment to education, planning and
coordination, financial resources and well staffed hospital
emergency services.
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